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The Private and Social Costs of Unemployment
Martin Feldstein
This short note emphasizes and illustrates two
basic points:
(1) The private costs of unemployment, i.e.,
the costs borne by the unemployed themselves, vary sub-
stantially and are often extremely low. This low private
cost is an important cause of the permanently high un—
employment rate in the United States.
(2) The social costs of unemployment, i.e.,
the costs of unemployment to the nation as a whole re-
gardless of how they are distributed, must be judged
by considering the specific policy by which a worker would
be reemployed. It is wrong to regard unemployment as
either without cost (because the unemployed enjoy the
opportunity for job search and leisure) or as having a
cost equal to lost output. Examples are given to show
that output may overstate or understate true social cost,
depending on the options available for reemployment.
This paper was presented at the American Economic
Association meeting, 28 December 1977, in New York City.THE PRIVATE AND SOCIAL COSTS OF UNEPLOYMENT
Martin Feldstein*
Ue do not need a careful quantitative analysis to establish that
the unemployment of seven million workers involves very substantial
private and social costs. Why then should we bother to think about
measuring the cost of unemployment? There are two quite different
reasons. First, by measuring the private costs of unemployment that
are borne by the unemployed themselves, we can better understand why
our unemployment rate is so high. Second, by examining the social
costs of unemployment (i.e., the costs of unemployment to the nation
as a whole regardless of how they are distributed), we can better decide
when the benefits of a reduction in unemployment outweigh the costs of
achieving it. The present paper considers both of these problems, em-
phasizing the conceptual issues rather than presenting specific estimates.
Because unemployment is so often thought of in aggregate terms,
it is worth emphasizing at the outset that a proper analysis of the
costs of unemployment must begin by disaggregating. The private cost
of unemployment is very large for some of the unemployed but is quite
small for many others. The average private cost of unemployment is
therefore much less relevant than the distribution of such costs.
Similarly, in considering the social costs of unemployment, it is
important to distinguish several kinds of unemployment since the cost
of each type of unemployment and the costs of reducing that unemployment
differ significantly.
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I. Private Costs
Thecostof unemployment that is borne by the unemployed person
himself varies from the overwhelming to the trivial. At one extreme
is the very substantial loss by those who experience a long period of
unemployment with little or no help from transfer payments. At the
other extreme, is the minimal loss of those who are out of work very
briefly and whose lost net income is fully replaced by unemployment
compensation. Although there is a wide range of experience, the typical
spell of unemployment is closer to the "low cost" extreme than to the
high cost extreme. Even now, more than half of the unemployment spells
last four weeks or less. Moreover, more than half of the unemployed
received unemployment compensation. I believe that the relatively low
cost of unemployment in these circumstances is a substantial cause of
our high permanent rate of unemployment.
The principal reason for the low private cost of unemployment is
the interaction of our tax system and our system of unemployment com-
pensation. It is particularly important to consider these two together.
The income and social security taxes now imply a marginal tax rate in
the neighborhood of 30 percent for a worker in a median income family
It is therefore very significant that unemployment compensation is not
subject to tax.The combination of a relatively high marginal tax on
earnings and no tax on unemployment compensation implies that unemploy—
iaent benefits replace a very high fraction of lost net income, typically
about two—thirds.—3—
An example will illustrate how this occurs. Consider a worker
in Massachusetts in 1977 with a wife and two children. lUs gross
earnings are $140 per week while hers are $100 per week. If he is
unemployed for 10 weeks, lie loses $1400 in gross earnings but only
$279 in net income. Why does this occur? A fall in gross earnings
of $1400 reduces his federal income tax by $226, his social security
tax by $82, and his Massachusetts income tax by $75. Thus, total taxes
fall by $383, implying that net wages are reduced by $1017.
Unemployment benefits are 50 percent of his wage plus a dependents'
allowance of $6 per child per week. The benefit is thus $82 a week.
Since there is an annual one—week "waiting period" before benefits
begin, nine weeks of benefits are paid for the ten week unemployment
spell. Total benefits are thus $738. The loss in net income is only
the $279 difference between these benefits and the fall in after—tax
wages. The $279 private net income loss is less than 20 percent of
the loss in output as neasured by the gross wage.
Because of the one—week waiting period, the private cost of
uneraploynent is even lower for an additional week of unenpioyrent.
If he stays unemployed for 11 weeks instead of 13, he loses an addi-
tional $140 in gross earnings but only $16 in net income. Tue private
netincome loss is less than 12percent of the lossin output as
mcasiircd by the gross wage. If the individual values his leisure and
non—r.iarket workactivitiesat even 50 cents anhour, there is no net
private cost of unemployment!
The greatreductionin the private cost of unepployment that results
from this interaction of higi taxes on earnings and the untaxed—4—
unemployment benefits produce substantial adverse incentives that
magnify the cyclical volatility of unemployment and raise the non—
cyclical "baseline level" of unemployment. The most obvious effect
is to increase the average duration of unemployment spells. With
little or no personal cost of a longer period of unemployment, it is
rational for the individual to look for a new job until the potential
gain from additional search is extremely small or to use the low cost
time to do chores at home or just to enjoy a period of vacation. In
addition to increasing the average duration of existing unemployment
spells, the low private cost of unemployment also causes an increase
in the number of unemployment spells. Since workers who quit their
jobs are eligible for benefits in a number of states, the low private
cost of unemployment is responsible for many of the one million
unemployed who quit their last job.
More significant, however, is the incentive for temporary layoffs.
Approximately half of the unemployment spells that are officially
classified as "job losses" are actually temporary layoffs in which the
unemployed worker expects to return to his original job. In inanu—
facturing, approximately 80 percent of those who are laid off do return
to their original jobs. Our system of unemployment compensation lowers
the cost of such temporary layoffs to both firms and workers, making
unemployment more attractive than accumulating inventories or cutting
prices.
I have concentrated these comments on unemployment compensation
because this is the most significant program for reducing the private
costs of unemployment. Those who are not eligible for unemployment—5—
compensation often receive other forms of income replacement such as
food stamps, social security and welfare. It is also important to
remember that a very large fraction of the unemployed who do not
receive unemployment compensation are young people who are supported
by their families.
It is easy to see how our system of taxes and transfers dras-
tically lowers the relative private cost of unemployment and thereby
induces a higher unemployment rate. The real puzzle is why the low
private cost of unemployment does not result in a higher rate of
unemployment. What are the forces of self—restraint that limit the
public's w1llinness to exploit the full opportunities for subsidized
unemployment? And will they continue to be effective In the future?
Public attitudes about accepting transfer payments appear to have been
changing rapidly during the past decade, resulting in the rapid growth
of such things as disability insurance benefits, food stamps and health
insurance payments. The contaousness of social attitudes suggests that
this trend may accelerate in the future. It carries with it an ominous
prospect for unemployment.
II. Social Costs
The social cost of an unertiployiient spell depends of the social
opportunity cost of the unemployed time. In measuring the
social cost of unemployment, it is therefore crucial to ask "Unemployment
as compared to what?" As economists, we tend to define the opportunity
cost of any resource as its value in the best possible use to which it—6—
mightbe put. But the relevant opportunity cost in thecurrentcontext
isnot this "best allocation" of full employment general equilibriwn
theory. e are interested in the social costs of unemployment in
order to assess the desirability of particular unemployment policies.
Differentpolicies imply differentopportunity costs for the unemployed
workers.In each case, we shouldcompare the particular net social
costof unemployment ——i.e.,the potential benefit of returning the
unemployed person to work ——withthecost of the policy itself.
Theformat ofthis sessionsuggests that all policies to reduce
unemploymententail increasing inflation,implying that the relevant
comparisonisbetween the social costs of unemployment and the social
costs of inflation. If this were true, the implicationwould be quite
dismalsince most economists now agree that a permanent increase in
inflation cannot achieve more than a temporary reduction inunemployment.1
Fortunately,there are policies for reducing unemployment permanently
thatdo not involve increases in inflation. These policies may involve
such costsas a reallocation of some workers from more productive to
less productive activities, as a reduction in unemployment insurance
protection,or a redistribution of income with losses by some groups and
gains by others. A proper evaluation of available policies requires
quantifying the costs and benefits of each.
Before looking at some examples of the social costs associated
with different types of unemployment, it is useful to comment on two
extreme but common views of the social cost ounemployment. According
11n a growing economy, the present value of the social cost of a
permanent Increase in Inflation can beextremelylarge relative to the
gainfrom a tempo'ary reduction in unemployment; see Feldstein (1977).—7—
to one view, unemployment has no social or private cost. The indivi-
dual's loss of wage income is at least offsetby the value of his
leisure and of the inforaation that he acquires by his job search
activity. This conclusion is false even if we accept its premise that
all unemployment is voluntary. The taxes and unemployment insurance
described above imply a substantial gap between the individual'sgross
wage and the value of his time when unemployed. The existence of the
rigiditiesthat cause involuntary unemployment only strengthens the
reason to reject this view.
At the other extreme is the view that the loss inwage income
is equal to the social cost of unemployment. This ignores the value
ofthe jiidividual's leisureand of theinformationgained by searching
for anew job. Iloreover, even if both of these were zero, it would be
wrong to regard the individual's normal or potential wage as a measure
of thegain that would result from his reemployment without specifying
thepolicy that would be used to achieve his reemployment.
Consider, for example, the case of workers on temporary layoff.
As I noted above, some 80 percent of workers who are laid offby
manufacturing firms soon return to their original jobs at those firms.
Such temporary layoffs are almost completely unknown inEurope and
Japan. This important source of unemployment could be significantly
reducedif the employer tax that is used to finance unemployment
compensationwere changed to eliminate the current subsidy of excessive
layoffs.UhileI believe that this would he a worthwhile reform, the
benefitof such a change should not be overstated.The social cost of
the unemployment that would thereby beeliminated is not the normal—8—
wage of these workers or even that wage reduced by the value of their
leisure. A reduction in temporary layoffs would mean more production
for inventory and more spells of below average productivity.
This example also illustrates the familiar principle of welfare
economics that it may be possible to Identify a good policy in terms
ofthe marginal conditions without explicitly evaluating the gains
from the policy. In this case, it seems clear that eliminating the
subsidy that increases temporary layoff unemployment would be a move
inthe right direction even though the value of the gain is unknown.
Although the theory of the second best cautions against this general
line of reasoning, an explicit partial equilibriumcalculation of the
gainfrom reducing unemployment is unlikely to be an Improvement in
this regard. An explicit calculation of the social cost of temporary
layoffunemployment would be of value primarily in deciding whether
the economic gains of the reform outweighed the political costs of
achievingit.
Althoughthe potential wage will generally overstate the social
cost of unemployment, there is an Important case in which it is art
understatement. For young workers, unemployment means not only the
loss of output and earnings but, more important, the missed opportunity
for on—the—job training and experience. The very high unemployment rates
among low skilled youth Is symptomatic of the more serious problem that
the jobs available to them generally offer little opportunity for
training or advancement. The social cost of youth unemployment thus
depends very much on the comtetnplated alternative. If we judge the
social cost of youth unemployment by the type of no—training jobs thatare currently available, the cost is relatively low. But if employ-
ment with useful on—the—job training is a feasible alternative, the
social cost of youth unemployment is substantially greater than the
immediate loss of output.
III. Conclusion
In this short note, I have emphasized two basic points. First,
the private cost of unemployment varies substantially and is often
extremely low. This low private cost is an important cause of the
permanently high unemployment rate in the United States. Second, the
social costs of unemployment must be judged by considering the specific
policy by which a worker would be reemployed.
In selecting these points for emphasis, I have ignored many of the
issues generally associated with measuring the costs of unemployment.
That is inevitable in a note of this length. In conclusion, however,
I want to call attention to two further costs of a chronically high
unemployment rate that are likely to be of great long—run importance.
If we do not change the structural causes of our high unemployment
rate, we will face growing pressure to adopt the strategy of some
European countries that supress unenployment by denying firms the right
to lay off workers without government approval and by denying those
workers who lose their jobs the right to decide where and when they will
return to work. In addition, a chronically high unemployment rate will
create strong pressures for expansionary macroeconomic policies that will
serve only to exaccerbate inflation. The loss of freedom in labor—10—
markets and the increase in inflation throughout the economy would
be an extremely high cost to bear for our failure to reform the
incentives and eliminate the barriers that create our unemployment
prol)leUS.—11—
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